Changes in efficiency and n equity accruing from government involvement in Ugandan primary education

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CHANGES IN EFFICIENCY AND IN EQUITY ACCRUING FROM GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN UGANDAN PRIMARY EDUCATION*

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In an article on educational planning, C. Arnold Anderson and Mary Jean Bowman (1968) suggest that there is a conflict between equity and efficiency in the distribution of schools. Since independence, each Anglogphonic African state has altered the English educational inheritance of local religious and voluntary schools and has opted in favor of a more centralized system of state control. Centralized control, according to Anderson and Bowman, could theoretically act as a vehicle for an increase in equity by spreading schools more evenly throughout the population and therefore limiting the advantages which could accrue to the children of the privileged. On the other hand, the authors view centralized control as a device which might obstruct the efficient utilization of schools, since the pattern of school distribution reflects the local population's interest in education and their effort to acquire it.

By extension, Anderson and Bowman infer that localized decision-making would tend to maximize efficiency. They say that "[in] localities where given educational efforts will evoke the largest response in attendance and in demand for further schooling . . . [such effort] tends to be realized by local interest and resources" (1968: 361).

I wish to explore the Anderson and Bowman equity-efficiency dilemma by focusing upon Uganda as a case in point. I do not differ substantially from them. As assumed from their thesis, there have been changes in efficiency and in equity since Ugandan government became involved in primary education. But in contrast to the expectations of their thesis, I question whether the effect of government involvement has not been detrimental to three specific areas of equity—the same equity under whose guise centralized action was originally motivated.1

The efforts of the Ugandan central government2 to bring primary education under its control have been chronicled elsewhere (Nsibambi, 1971). By the end of the decade following its 1962 independence the state had acquired a monopoly over the training of teachers, school inspection, the composition and powers of school management committees, the contracting and purchase of school furnishings, the purchase of all classroom supplies, and the handling of all school monies. Although 85 percent of the schools remain affiliated with religious organizations, these institutions no longer play a role in primary school administration.

* I am indebted to the National Institute of Education at Makerere University and the Comparative Education Center at the University of Chicago for technical support and substantive criticism. In addition, I am indebted to the Social Research Group at George Washington University for their kind assistance.
TEACHER PLACEMENT

Before independence, teachers were trained by religious institutions but hired independently by the primary school. Each denomination set its own salary scales and each school purchased as highly qualified teachers as parental income or interest in educational investment would permit. In 1964, however, the Chief Education Officer in the Ministry of Education received the power to require a teacher to serve in any school in Uganda (Ministry of Education, 1965). A single salary scale was established through adoption of the Lawrence Committee recommendations of 1961 (Uganda Government, 1961). Thus, as secondary school graduates began to enter primary school teaching for the first time in the latter part of the decade, the crucial distribution of these highly qualified Grade IIIs was already in the hands of the state.

By 1972, the Grade III teachers (secondary school graduates) made up eight percent of the teaching force, but, more importantly, their distribution appears to have been equitable among the schools. In my study, I found that Grade III teachers are assigned almost exclusively to P7 (the highest grade). If not yet assigned a Grade III teacher, a school is placed as priority for the next assignment. Grade III teachers are valuable public additions to a school’s prestige. Headmasters who learn of a nearby school’s receiving the benefit of a new Grade III will be quick with complaints until their school is placed on a placement list. Grade IIIs are almost always found singly within a school, and in the future will not be found teaching any classes other than P7 until all schools are allocated a Grade III teacher.

Though highly trained teachers have been distributed equitably, the efficiency of teaching may have suffered for several reasons. First, the new placement procedure leaves little room for individual school, parent, headmaster, or community initiative to be expressed through the acquisition of higher quality teachers—even if they are willing to pay for them. The school has little or no choice in personnel. Indeed, it is common for a teacher to be seen for the first time upon his arrival, bag in hand, after being assigned. Neither is a teacher’s placement request considered a high priority. Second, salaries are now paid and decided by government officials far from the actual teaching; it is difficult to identify superior teaching, and there is no way to reward it. Salaries are set by national scales regardless of regional or local variations; promotions are automatic with seniority.

SCHOOL INSPECTION

Before centralized control, voluntary agencies maintained their own systems and criteria for inspection. Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim educational associations had a supervisor and two assistants in each district in addition to an accountant, a clerk, and a cashier. When the government acquired the responsibility for school visitation and record audits, it mixed its personnel so that the religious affiliation of a school or a school inspector would not remain a factor in a school’s evaluation. District Educational Officers were not, as a rule, permitted to administer their districts of birth. Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim teachers were placed in schools interchangeably, and the country lost the very strong interreligious rivalry between primary schools which had once been so prevalent and so obvious (Scanlon, 1965; Weeks, 1968; Hindmarsh, 1966; Smyth, 1971: 87-143).

MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

School management committees were once powerful organizations. They were charged with the responsibilities of planning, construction, raising donations for both
money and labor, clearing all major school expenditures, and collaborating on the hiring of personnel. Under the voluntary agencies, a headmaster's first level of responsibility was to report to and abide by the instructions of his school's management committee. Its members consisted of the following: an appointee of the national religious agency, the local minister, priest or sheikh, parents, and some of the important members of the community who were elected by the parents of the school children. More often than not, those chosen by the parents to represent them on the committee were local religious elders. Therefore, the elected members of the community plus the religious leader usually provided a religious ethic to the management of school affairs before central control.

Today the committee may encourage local donations and construction, but no school is permitted to have its own management committee. The government has combined schools into groups of three or four based upon geographical proximity. Each group of schools has a management committee. The new committee consists of four categories of members: (1) three chosen by the whole collectivity of parents in each group of schools; (2) one from the parents of each school; (3) three appointments of the representative of the Chief Education Officer (i.e., the District Education Officer); and (4) four appointments from each district's "Education Committee"—a group the majority of whose members are appointments of the political administrator of each district (i.e.: the District Officer).

Individual schools have lost the power to govern their own affairs. If an individual school wishes to raise a particular issue with the government, it can only do so as part of a group. Even then, because school representatives are outnumbered by government representatives (7-6), schools (even in groups) must choose their issues carefully. The political effects of these changes may be more germane to the later discussion of school finance. For now I wish simply to make three points which apply both to school inspection and to school management committees.

First, equity in the distribution of services may have been advanced due to the apportionment of administrative talent on the basis of geography and not of religion. Inputs have increased in the previously laggard Muslim schools. Second, school management is no longer community controlled, because the local church or mosque leaders and the children's parents are no longer influential. Third, although the loss of church influence has been a necessary by-product of centralized control, efficiency may have suffered in teacher motivation, in school inspection, and in community interest due to the elimination of the old religious competition expressed so often with community zeal. Ronald Hindmarsh (1966: 157) also expresses this view when he notes that

One of the main difficulties here is staffing. Every school staff should have something of a team spirit; one of the ways in which this can come about is through sharing common views and attitudes on spiritual and moral matters. This should not be so difficult among practicing Christians, but enough antagonism and suspiciousness are still about to make cooperation in a non-denominational foundation uneasy. The ecumenical thinking of the last few years has had little effect on African Christendom. Even if an equal number of teachers from each denomination were appointed, the attempt to create nondenominationalism would have failed because the difference in religious allegiance would have been permanently underlined.

School inspectors, teachers, and committee members who previously regarded their school's competitiveness as the vanguard of their religious conviction today are vastly more neutral with the now non-sectarian schools. Except for individual pride in individual children, there is little to fill the vacuum created by centralization.
SCHOOL FURNISHINGS

All schools need desks and chairs and benches. Under the voluntary agencies, headmasters were responsible for finding a local carpenter who could estimate costs and buy enough wood to manufacture and maintain furniture for the local school. The financial agreement between the headmaster and the carpenter was audited by the old school management committee.

The headmaster no longer has this responsibility. Today the District Education Officer locates a single firm in the district capital which will supply all the schools in the district. Prices, styles, and quality are fixed. The centralization rationale has been to lower the per unit cost by increasing the volume, and eliminating the graft which may have existed within the headmaster's contractual agreements with the local carpenter.

When asked, headmasters argue that the furniture now costs double what it would be to construct locally. In addition, the school now must withstand the costs of transportation from the district capital and the loss due to breakage in transport. Several headmasters mentioned that if the district's firm is short of supply, furniture for smaller children is substituted and that the quality of the wood is decreasing. Lastly, headmasters have commonly argued that corruption under the old system, where religious elders oversaw all school expenditure, was unlikely.

But however universal the complaints of the headmasters, it does seem that by sacrificing local headmaster responsibility for school furnishings, local government has opened itself up to legitimate charges of price increases due now to the cost of transportation. Although headmasters have certainly lost the possibility of making a profit out of a furniture contract kickback, the potential of such an occurrence at the district level has certainly not been eliminated.

SCHOOL FEES AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTS

Under the auspices of Uganda's voluntary agencies, it was possible for different school rates to exist. Schools in more prosperous areas could charge more than schools in the poorer districts. There were also communities where parents were willing to contribute additional amounts of money to education. Today, however, the central government has standardized the charges for school attendance (Ministry of Education, 1972), and no school is permitted to charge more or less, regardless of the parents' willingness to contribute.

This standardization has definitely cemented the costs of primary school for a range of families and districts with greatly varying levels of resources. Although costs are now equal, it is still true that costs set on a national scale impose serious burdens on poorer families and poorer districts.

Furthermore, the responsibility of maintaining and accounting for school monies has been withdrawn from the purview of the headmaster and placed in the hands of the District Education Officer. Previously, each school maintained its own account at a local bank. The responsibility for placing money in the account and for keeping records on the account's activity was that of the headmaster. Checks could be written or cash withdrawn with permission of the chairman of the school's management committee. Audits of the account were made periodically both by the management committee as a whole and by a representative of the religious agency with which the school was affiliated.

Today, school fees are collected by the headmaster and, after receipts are handed to
the parents, the cash is received at the district education office. No longer does the management committee have the authority for overseeing expenditures from its school's account. Responsibility for an account's balance rests solely with the District Education Officer. Balance statements of a school's account are to be made known to the headmaster at periodic intervals, or upon request.

**SCHOOL SUPPLIES AND THE UGANDA SCHOOL SUPPLY LIMITED**

Before schools were government-controlled, each headmaster, with guidance from his staff and permission from his management committee, could purchase equipment and supplies wherever the product was the cheapest and the most convenient to obtain. Most schools purchased their books through one of the branches of the Uganda Bookshop (owned by the Church of Uganda) or the Catholic bookshops, and their odd equipment such as balls, ink, or ledger books through one of the local general stores (*dukas*) at the nearest trading center. In Kampala, or if the school had access to a motor vehicle, the range of choice was broadened even further.

Headmasters are no longer permitted to shop for supplies since the establishment in 1967 of a purchasing monopoly over school supplies. The Uganda School Supply Limited (USSL) was included as part of the Milton Obote Foundation, established as a "private, non-profit" corporation whose aim was to finance and administer services for the good of the nation in the name of the "socialist" (now ex-) president. Since the coup d'état in January 1971, the government changed the title of the Milton Obote Foundation to the Uganda National Trust—whose board of directors is the cabinet, and whose chairman of the board is the president, General Idi Amin Dada. Clearly, USSL has become a state organization.

In June, each headmaster of each primary school must complete a lengthy USSL order on which he must list every piece of equipment the school will need over the academic year commencing in January. The USSL purchases, imports, prices, and distributes all primary school equipment: soccer balls, rulers, chalk, maps, and all textbooks and readers for all grades in all subjects. The complete USSL order form is collected by each District Education Officer and is reviewed to make certain that each school's order is within its financial balance limit. By this procedure the District Education Officer ensures that each school already has sufficient funds to apply for the next year's order. From the school's point of view, since the District Education Officer already has the school's money, the order is being made for equipment already paid for.

After the District Education Officer collects and approves of all the schools' orders, he presents the district's collective order to USSL headquarters in Kampala. The USSL then purchases supplies for the nation as a unit, distributes the incoming supplies to the districts (who then distribute supplies to the schools) and collects its payment from each district's Educational Officer. The USSL keeps track of each school's account.

In the study of school achievement, I began to notice that some schools were being well supplied with new equipment and texts while others were not. This was not supposed to be the case. Standardization of school fees had been designed to eliminate differences between rich and poor or active and inactive parents. Government handling of accounts was supposed to ensure that money was not siphoned off by ill-motivated headmasters. In short, because all children now pay the same amount to attend school, because all school equipment through USSL is uniform in cost and quality, the unequal distribution of educational equipment was to be eliminated. Each child was to have had
equal opportunity and equal exposure to materials at equal cost.

Yet to an observer of book and equipment inputs it is obvious that unequal distribution of goods and services continues despite major reforms. Although schools collect and hand to the District Education Officer the same amount of money per child, they do not receive the same amount of supplies per child in return.

I kept a record of the number of pre-paid textbooks and reference books which each school received during the year 1971 by locating the school copy of the USSL delivery receipts. In addition, I looked at the total number of references and texts on each school's order for the same year and then calculated the percentage of each school's book order which was actually received. Because this percentage ranged in size from 0 to 229 percent, I was curious as to why some schools received a higher percentage of their book orders. To explore this, I correlated the percentage of each school's filled USSL book order with a number of other facts that are known about each school: the results are illustrated in Table 1.

No statistically significant relationship existed between the percentage of a school's textbook order actually received by the school and the per capita wealth or population density of a school's gombolola, nor the mean education of a school's teachers. The percentage of textbook order filled is not positively related to school achievement ($r = -.165$), nor to the per capita number of texts already available deriving largely from the school's efforts made previous to government monopolization of supplies ($r = -.04$).

Several measures stand out in importance for understanding how textbooks are now distributed. First, there is a solid relationship ($r = .368$) between the percentage of the textbook order received and the urban or semi-urban location of the school. Because of the lack of a statistically significant relationship between population density and the textbook order received (many isolated, rural areas in Toro and Bugisu Districts have high population densities), there is something specifically advantageous to a school in an urban location. I believe this to be so because headmasters in or near an urban area can get private transportation directly to a USSL supply depot. In a personal visit, the headmaster can collect what he wishes since supplies are distributed on a first-come, first-served basis. In this way, a few urban schools could acquire well in excess of 100 percent of their original order, thereby helping to create shortages within USSL, while rural schools, without private transportation, depend upon delivery from the district depot through normal channels.\textsuperscript{15}

But it is not until one looks at the measures of social status that one begins to see the most important pattern. The percentage of texts and reference works arriving at a school has something to do with the parental education of teachers ($r = .549$ ($p < .001$)); something to do with the occupation of the fathers of P7 pupils ($r = .255$); something to do with the education of the fathers of P7 pupils ($r = .535$ ($p < .001$)); and something rather strongly to do with the number of modern possessions which the P7 pupils have in their homes ($r = .638$ ($p < .001$)). These latter correlations definitely suggest that school books, even after considerable egalitarian effort on the part of the government, continue to be unequally distributed among schools. But most importantly, besides being geographically related, the distribution patterns following government monopolization are strongly related to the socio-economic status of the pupils and their teachers within the schools, and are clearly not indicative of the equitable distribution which was supposed to result from the social reforms.

This is a critical point for any nation considering the argument that the distribution of goods and services by purchase is discriminatory against the poor. It is a common
argument that the state can distribute items more equitably. This would be an acceptable assumption if there were empirical evidence detailing how items are, in fact, distributed in socialist societies. But because the percentage of the textbook order actually received by the school was not at all related to the per capita amount of books already available to P7 pupils as a result of previous distribution patterns \( r = .04 \), an argument might be made that the previous system of textbook acquisition, based on parental wealth and/or effort, was less associated with social privilege. Indeed, the correlations between the per capita number of books already in P7 and (pupil) paternal education \( r = .125 \) or modern possessions \( r = .285 \) might support this argument, for these latter correlations, being results of previous inequities, are weaker than the 1972 inequities in USSL distribution \( r = .535 \) and \( r = .638 \).

Thus, although schools were given equal resources for textbook purchase, the actual distribution of texts in 1972 was more closely related to the level of social privilege of the pupils and teachers in the schools than it had been in all those years when the purchase of texts had been restricted by parental wealth and occupational status. Although it can be argued that a national monopoly like USSL, being new (1967), and inexperienced, should certainly expect a period of administrative adjustment of its very complex tasks, the patterns of unequal distribution are far from random. It would be difficult to suggest that the correlation between the percentage of a textbook order filled and a school's socio-economic status was a function of administrative inexperience. These patterns of unequal distribution suggest that one must be cautious in accepting the assumption that a state monopoly, even when motivated by well-intentioned goals, is by definition a more equitable distributor of goods and services.

**FINANCE**

Tangential to the unbalanced distribution of textbooks is the question of money. Headmasters who receive less than one hundred percent of their pre-paid USSL orders feel victimized. Since the average school in the sample received only sixty percent of its USSL order in 1971, a large amount of money supposedly delivered to the local government for textbooks does not seem to be directly utilized.

It is difficult for headmasters in some districts to enquire after the status of their school's account balance. In Toro District, for example, in 1972, in spite of numerous requests, fifty percent of the headmasters had never been told the status of their account since the district government took control in 1967. Because management committees are dominated by the appointees of the district government, embarrassing questions could be avoided. Fifty percent of the Toro school management committees had not been able to raise a quorum for the previous two years.\(^16\)

Children pay their fees or they cannot remain in school. Headmasters issue receipts and turn the cash into the district education office where the money is required to be kept on record and used to pay the USSL. But in 1972, district governments owed USSL over three and one half million shillings; some districts were in such financial arrears that USSL was forced to stop sending any school supplies until some payment could be made.\(^17\) What has happened to the money remains a question for speculation.

**SUMMARY**

I wish to suggest that as a result of government intervention in previously voluntary schools, loss in efficiency is likely to have occurred in each of seven administrative areas.
Where community interest and parental affluence previously contributed to variance between schools, the effect of government administrative activity has made it impossible for parental efforts to be expressed directly. By withdrawing the ability of headmasters to hire their own teachers or keep their own accounts, centralization has made it impossible for individual differences in personnel and personal effort initiated from the local level to take effect.

On the other hand, there have been some gains in equity due to centralization reforms. As Table 2 illustrates, certainly the distribution of Grade III teachers and the standardization of school fees has eliminated the gross differentials between rich or educationally active communities and those which are neither. I have no impressions which would suggest that changes in school inspection or in management committees have altered equal educational opportunity in either direction.

Yet most noteworthy are the three areas where I suggest that there may have been losses not only in efficiency but in equity as well. Certainly the positive correlation between the percentage of a textbook order filled and the urbanity or the socio-economic status of a school's pupils demonstrates that supplies are distributed unevenly despite the egalitarian motives behind centralization. Certainly also, the new system for administering school accounts, with its power of control concentrated in the District Education Officer, allows personal privilege to exercise more control over who has the opportunity to spend money than did the old system of each school accounting for its own income and its own budget. Lastly, the centralization of school furnishings can hardly be said to have aided equity in that prices now favor schools proximate to the district capital.

In the final analysis one must separate the effects of government involvement in previously voluntary efforts from the evidence of government effort up to this point. The paucity of qualified personnel and the lack of precedent make complex administration difficult. It would be unfair to pronounce centralized efforts as failures. But given the experience of Ugandan reforms, some caution must be exercised in arguing that an increment in centralized educational authority will provide a corresponding increment in school equity.

NOTES


2. Three levels of government were provided for within the federal republic of Uganda in 1962: a central government, four regional governments, and a number of district governments. After the dethroning of the Kabaka in 1967, and the suspension of the constitution following the coup in 1971, the authority of the regional governments has elapsed.

3. Trained teachers with senior secondary school experience are categorized as Grade III and are given a salary ranging from 300 to 600 shillings per year. Primary school graduates with training are categorized as Grade II and have a salary scale of between 189 to 354 shillings per year. Primary school graduates with no training are being phased out through upgrading or natural attrition. These Grade I teachers may earn between 132 and 276 shillings per year.

4. My sample consists of a random selection of sixty-seven primary schools from five districts (North and South Karamoja, Bugisu, West Buganda and Toro) and three urban areas (Kampala/Entebbe, Jinja, and Mable/Tororo). These sixty-seven schools represent 10.7 percent of all the schools in the sample districts. I gathered information from all the teachers (N=598) and all the P7 pupils (N=2,973) in the sixty-seven schools which represented 2.9 percent and 12.6 percent of all the teachers and P7 pupils in the sampled districts. In addition, I interviewed civil servants in the
district governments and in the Ministry of Education at the central and local levels, officers of the Uganda Teachers Association, the Uganda Headmasters Association, and the Uganda School Supply Limited. See Heyneman (forthcoming).

5. I suspect that the equality of distribution of Grade III teachers has contributed two effects to my study on academic achievement. First, little variance in mean teacher training could be found between schools, and second, there was no correlation between a school's mean teacher training and a school's mean achievement score.

6. North and South Karamoja are exceptions. Teachers there have been given a five percent pay bonus as an incentive for placement in those districts, which are considered remote in Uganda.

7. This does not imply that the competition between religiously affiliated schools did not have negative aspects both in terms of efficiency and in terms of equity. For example, if a child was not affiliated with the religion of the local school, he either had to walk a long distance to the school of his affiliation, or he had to do without school.

8. This does not refer to the non-African Muslim schools of the economically privileged former Asian community.

9. This is not to imply that headmasters have ever been indifferent to the notion of profitability. Because of the scarcity of school places, some can be found operating a private school (using the government school buildings and equipment) after normal school hours, and collecting unreported fees from the parents of the children who were unable to find a place in the normal “day” school.

10. Ideally, the headmaster should also keep his own records. However, this has often been impossible due to the District Education Officer's backlog of accounting. See the section above on Finance, second paragraph.

11. “Socialist” refers to how Obote thought of himself and his government. See, for example, Milton Obote (1969).

12. Secondary school headmasters may purchase equipment and books anywhere they wish. They also oversee their own accounts.

13. Until 1972, exercise books, manufactured and distributed in Uganda by Ugationers Ltd. (Mbale) was the only exception to the USSL monopoly. In 1972, however, Ugationers was nationalized and exercise books will in the future be distributed through USSL. (Ramandhai K. Patel, owner and general manager, Ugationers Ltd., private interview, Mbale, 8 March 1972).

14. Through USSL, the transport cost has been equalized. A pencil costs the same for a school in Karamoja as in Kampala. Since there is one national price for each piece of equipment, this is an exception to the decrease in equity argument.

15. Sixty percent of the schools receiving more books than they ordered (i.e., over 100 percent) were located in urban areas. All had headmasters who picked up their orders personally. Having received over 100 percent of an order does not imply that the additional books were not paid for; it does imply that these schools were informed that they had large monetary balances and were given “special” permission to purchase additional supplies without having to wait for the next year's order forms.

16. An additional hypothesis exists to explain this fact. Quorums could have been difficult to raise because the appointments to school management committees, made under the Obote regime, were unsure if they were to continue. Local authorities preferred not to appoint new or re-appoint old members without receiving explicit instructions from Kampala.

17. Kegeze, Kampala, Ankole, and Karamoja are examples of districts which were in such financial arrears that USSL ceased supplying equipment of any kind until the districts had made some payment. (Mr. John Kaggwa, Acting Director, USSL, private interview, Kampala, 9 June 1972). Karamoja, for example, had debts totalling 162,209 shillings as of 22 February 1972. Reference: AGM/D13/400/72.

REFERENCES


### TABLE 1:
Zero-Order Correlations between the Percentage of Prepaid Texts Received by a School and a Number of Other School Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Characteristic</th>
<th>Correlation (N = 36)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Density of a School's Gombolola</td>
<td>-.152 (N.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Taxes Collected from a School's Gombolola</td>
<td>.108 (N.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Number of P7 Books Available</td>
<td>.040 (N.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean School Academic Achievement</td>
<td>-.165 (N.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Experience of School Teachers</td>
<td>.181 (N.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location in an Urban, Semi-Urban, or Rural Area</td>
<td>.368 (p&lt;.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Experience of Teachers' Parents</td>
<td>.549 (p&lt;.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternal Occupational Level of P7 Pupils</td>
<td>.255 (N.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternal Education of P7 Pupils</td>
<td>.535 (p&lt;.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Modern Possessions in P7 Pupil Homes†</td>
<td>.638 (p&lt;.001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Private primary schools were not obligated to purchase through USSL; nor was Buddo Jr. (informally) or Kitante or Nakasero (formally)—which catered to children of the country's top elite. This figure represents the total number of schools within the sample who were obliged to purchase all supplies through USSL, and who had sufficient records available for inspection on the day of the survey visit.

† bed, newspaper, bicycle, radio, clock, car, television.

### TABLE 2:
Increases and Decreases in Equity and Efficiency between 1963-1972 Accruing from the Decision to Centralize Seven Primary School Administrative Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Responsibility</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Equity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allocation and Placement of Teachers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Inspection</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Committees</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Furniture</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization of School Fees</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Supply</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Accounts</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>